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Abstract
This paper presents new evidence that increases in college enrollment lead to a decline in
the average quality of college graduates between 1960 and 2000, resulting in a decrease of 8
percentage points in the college premium. The standard demand and supply framework (Katz
and Murphy, 1992, Card and Lemieux, 2001) can qualitatively account for the trend in the
college and age premia over this period, but the quantitative adjustments that need to be made
to account for changes in quality are substantial. Furthermore, the standard interpretation of
the supply eﬀect can be misleading if the quality of college workers is not controlled for. To
illustrate the importance of these adjustments, we reanalyze the problem studied in Card and
Lemieux (2001), who observe that the rise in the college premium in the 1980s occurred mainly
for young workers, and attribute this to the diﬀerential behavior of the supply of skill between
the young and the old. Our results show that changes in quality are as important as changes
in prices to explain the phenomenon they document.
1 Introduction
The college-high school wage diﬀerential in the US declined in the 1970s, increased rapidly in the
1980s, and continued to rise in the 1990s, but at a slower pace (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992;
Katz and Autor, 1999; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Autor et al., 2008). These movements are usually
interpreted as reﬂecting changes in the prices of college and high school skill, brought on by shifts
in demand and supply. However, because of the rapid expansion in college enrollment during this
period, part of the changes in the college-high school wage diﬀerential could be compositional. The
decline in the college premium in the 1970s may reﬂect not only an increase in the supply of college
∗Email: p.carneiro@ucl.ac.uk and l.sokbae@ucl.ac.uk. We thank David Autor, Sami Berlinski, Richard Blundell,
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supported in part by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Research Grant RES-000-22-2542. We also
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1graduates, but also of a decline in their average quality. Similarly, the rise in the college premium
in the 1980s and 1990s could have been even more pronounced if the quality of college graduates
was stable during these two decades.
In this paper we present a novel decomposition of the trends in college and age premia into
price and composition eﬀects. Prices are determined by the interaction of the demand for skill
with the quantity of skill supplied in the market, while composition is determined by the quality
of individuals in each schooling level. Throughout the paper, we equate shifts in college worker
quality with shifts in the proportion of college enrollment, even though the former are unobserved.1
Separating changes in the supply of college labor from changes in the quality of college graduates
is a major empirical challenge, because these two variables generally move together. In order to
break this link we start by assuming that all individuals in a given age group working in the
same regional labor market (in the same year) face the same skill prices, even if they were born and
schooled in diﬀerent regions. However, their wages diﬀer because they have heterogeneous quantities
of skill, and this may be due to diﬀerences in composition across regions of birth. Therefore, by
comparing (within labor market) wages of individuals born in regions with diﬀerent fractions of
college enrollment (and therefore, with a diﬀerent average quality of college participants), we are
able to identify the eﬀect of quality on wages. We control for intrinsic diﬀerences across regions of
birth using region of birth dummies, which are allowed to vary with year and with age.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition behind our procedure. Using US Census data between 1960
and 2000, we group individuals into year-age-region of birth-region of residence cells. For each cell
we compute the college premium, and we estimate the proportion of college participants for each
cohort and region of birth, and the proportion of college participants for each year, age and region
of residence.2 Each line in the ﬁgure (and associated set of points) represents the relationship
between the college premium and the proportion in college in the region of birth (our measure
of composition) for a diﬀerent set of labor markets. Labor markets are grouped according to
the proportion of college workers in the region of residence (which is meant to represent supply).
Within each labor market, there is a clear negative relationship between the college premium and
1Therefore, for most of the paper we use the terms quality and composition interchangeably. In Section 6, we
present direct evidence of the decline in the quality of college workers due to the increase in the proportion of college
enrollment.
2We consider white males aged 25-60 only, grouped into 5 year age groups. We consider 9 regions of residence and
9 regions of birth (Census regions). The college premium is the diﬀerence in average log wages of those with exactly
16 years of schooling and those with 12 years of schooling. The proportion of those in college is the proportion of
individuals with at least some college. The same age groups and Census regions are also used in our main empirical
work.
2the proportion in college in each individual’s region of birth, which is conﬁrmed by the regression
line.3 It shows that within similar labor markets, those workers with the lowest college premium
were the ones born in regions of birth (and cohorts) where the college enrolment rate was the
highest, and (presumably) the average quality of college students was the lowest.
Our empirical strategy is analogous to the one used by Card and Krueger (1992) to estimate
the eﬀect of school quality on labor market outcomes, although its use is new in the present
context. One concern with it is that selective migration may bias our estimates, as emphasized in
Heckman et al. (1996). We address this concern by implementing a series of corrective procedures
adapted from Heckman et al. (1996) and Dahl (2002). More importantly, we argue that selective
migration would bias our estimates if changes in selective migration were correlated with changes
in schooling (see section 5), and we present evidence that this is unlikely to drive our results. We
also show that our results are robust to the inclusion of measures of school quality.
Much of the focus of the literature is on the college premium, but we devote similar attention to
the age premium since changes in this parameter are as large as those in the college premium. We
ﬁnd that the decline in the quality of college graduates between 1960 and 2000 lead to a decrease of
8 percentage points in the college premium. Given that the college premium grew by 19 percentage
points between these two years, this quality eﬀect is substantial. Our analysis of the age premium
shows even more striking results. For college graduates, we can attribute much of the ﬂuctuation
in the age premium (its increase in the 1970s and its decline in the 1980s) to movements in the
quality of college graduates. In contrast, the importance of quality changes on the average wage of
high school graduates is negligible. The diﬀerential eﬀects of worker quality for college and high
school wages can be explained by a model with at least two types of ability, one speciﬁc to high
school, and one speciﬁc to college. This provides a better description of the labor market than
a single ability model (e.g., Willis and Rosen, 1979; Carneiro et al., 2007; Deschˆ enes, 2007), and
constitutes the basis of our empirical framework.
Composition eﬀects of the type we discuss are often thought to be unimportant in the empirical
literature on the college premium, although their existence is well recognized.4 See Katz and Murphy
(1992), Juhn et al. (1993), Hoxby and Long (1999), Gosling et al. (2000), Galor and Moav (2000),
3Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance of the college premium in each cell. The slopes of all
three lines are negative and statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. We obtain a similar picture if, instead
of using the college premium as the dependent variable, we use average college wages in each cell.
4Our composition eﬀects are diﬀerent from those of Lemieux (2006), who studies the role of composition eﬀects
in terms of explaining the increase of the variance of unobserved skills over time.
3Acemoglu (2002), Juhn et al. (2005), Fortin (2006), among others. Very few empirical studies di-
rectly searched for composition eﬀects. For example, using the 1940-1990 US Census, Juhn et al.
(2005) found that increases in college enrollment led to a lower college premium through composi-
tion eﬀects, but their estimated eﬀects were quite small (the procedure we use is quite diﬀerent and
is likely to provide better variation for identiﬁcation of supply and quality eﬀects).5 Carneiro et al.
(2007) and Moﬃtt (2008) show that using the marginal treatment eﬀect (MTE) framework, mar-
ginal returns to college fall as more individuals go to college. Carneiro and Lee (2008) also use the
MTE framework, estimate a selection model using data for the 1990s from the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth of 1979 (using the standard instruments in the literature for identiﬁcation),
and show that a model compatible with the magnitude of selection observed in that dataset implies
the existence of large composition eﬀects.
Our paper is also related to the literature which tries to separate the role of the return to
schooling and return to ability in the evolution of college premium (Chay and Lee, 2000; Taber,
2001; Deschˆ enes, 2006), and to the empirical literature estimating returns to schooling purged of
selection bias. Their ﬁnding that selection bias is substantial and it is changing over time (even
keeping composition ﬁxed), reinforces the importance of studying changes in composition. The
two problems are diﬀerent sides of the same coin: if one believes that standard estimates of the
college premium are biased because of self-selection (and one would like to correct the bias), then
changes in self-selection (due to changes in composition) are bound to produce movements in the
college premium. Indeed, the neglect of composition eﬀects distorts our assessment of the economic
drivers of inequality. In the last 40 years, changes in worker quality mask increases in the return
to schooling larger than the ones we observe in the raw data, by exacerbating the role of increases
in the supply and attenuating the role of increases in the demand for college workers.
Finally, our analysis has a close parallel with the study of selective unemployment and inequal-
ity. This literature shows that changes in unemployment rates dramatically change the evolution of
inequality due to composition eﬀects. See, for example, Keane et al. (1988), Blundell et al. (2003),
Chandra (2003), Heckman and Todd (2003), Neal (2004), Blundell et al. (2007), Mulligan and Rubinstein
(2008), Petrongolo and Olivetti (2008), among others.
A concern with our approach is that, as in most of the literature, we take changes in supply,
demand and composition as given. This is a limitation of the analysis, on which we have nothing
5Rosembaum (2003) presents an alternative analysis reporting larger eﬀects.
4new to add. Card and Lemieux (2001) suggest that cohort size may be an important driver of
the trend in college participation, while Fortin (2006) emphasizes also the role of tuition policy
at the state level. In a diﬀerent context, Acemoglu et al. (2004) consider the diﬀerential extent of
mobilization for World War II across U.S. states as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in
female labor supply.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our empirical strategy. This is followed by
a description of the data in Section 3. Section 4 presents estimation results and then Section 5
reports a number of sensitivity checks. Section 6 provides some direct evidence on the decline of
college workers. Section 7 shows quality-adjusted trends in the college and age premia. Section 8
revisits the problem studied in Card and Lemieux (2001). Finally, we conclude in Section 9. The
appendix provides a more detailed description of data and some additional empirical results.
2 Econometric Framework
Section 2.1 presents a simple model of wage determination that allows for composition and price
eﬀects, together with a reduced form empirical strategy for distinguishing the two. Section 2.2
considers composition eﬀects and price determination in a standard model of the labor market
(Card and Lemieux, 2001).
2.1 A Simple Wage Structure
Each individual has schooling level S = k, where k = H,C (denoting high school and college).
There are separate labor markets for high school and college skills (e.g. Willis and Rosen, 1979;
Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985). Suppose that the wage of each individual i, of age a, at time t, who
is born and goes to school in region b,6 and works in region r (which may or may not be equal to






iatrb is the wage, Πk
atr is the price of k-type skill for those with schooling level k, in age
group a in year t working in region r, and Uk
i,t−a,b is the individual speciﬁc endowment of k-type
6Hoxby and Long (1999) show that at least 75% of individuals attend university in their state of residence.













i be an indicator which takes value 1 if the level of schooling is k, and 0 otherwise; Aiat
takes value 1 if an individual belongs to age group a in year t; Mitrb takes value 1 if an individual who
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This equation is the basis of our empirical models. It states that the average log wage of workers
in each (k,a,t,r,b) cell is equal to the sum of the log price of k-type skill for age group a in
labor market r at time t, and the average quality of workers in the corresponding cell. Therefore,
diﬀerences in the average log wages within each (k,a,t,r) cell among individuals from diﬀerent
regions of birth (b) reﬂect diﬀerences in quality across individuals from diﬀerent regions of birth.
We start by modelling πk
atr as ﬂexibly as possible, using full interactions between age, time
and region of residence dummies for each schooling group. Once schooling, age, time, and region
of residence are fully controlled for, the remaining variation in ωk
atrb must come from variation in
νk
atrb, allowing us to separate price and composition eﬀects.
Another advantage of this procedure is that, within labor market (t − a − r), diﬀerences in
schooling across cells (b) are not endogenous responses to unobserved diﬀerences in prices, since
prices are kept ﬁxed. The only source of variation in wages is variation in worker quality. The
drawback of this approach is that it does not allow us to understand the determinants of prices.
We come back to this in section 2.2.
We conjecture that νk
atrb varies over cells because of changes in the college participation rate.
For example, as more people go to college, the average ability of college-goers may fall.8 Thus, our
7We can extend this framework to allow for individual speciﬁc price shocks due, say, to shocks to match produc-
tivity (as long as they are uncorrelated with individual skill). The potential advantage of such an extension is that
it allows for changes in inequality even within (k,a,t,r,b) cells.
8One possible reason for this is that individuals are heterogenous and marginal college entrants might be of lower
quality than average college attendees. For example, see Carneiro et al. (2007) and Moﬃtt (2008). To illustrate this
idea, consider a simple economic model of college enrolment. Suppose that individuals enrol in college if returns
(β = Xγ+U) are larger than costs (C = Zη): S = 1 if Xγ−Zη+U > 0, where U is unobserved ability. It is possible
to rewrite this model as: S = 1 if P (X,Z) > V , with P (X,Z) = F−U (Xγ − Zη), V = F−U (−U), and F−U (.) is the
6variable of interest is the proportion of college-goers in cohort t − a born in region b (Pt−a,b).
However, it is unlikely that Pt−a,b is the only important factor determining diﬀerences in the
average quality of workers across cells. Regions of birth diﬀer in several other dimensions besides
the cost of schooling. For example, school resources may vary across regions. Well endowed
regions could have higher quality schools, which simultaneously lead to higher worker quality
(independently of composition) and higher college enrollment. We account for this by using region
of birth ﬁxed eﬀects as additional explanatory variables. Furthermore, we allow region of birth
to aﬀect both time trends and age proﬁles by including (region of birth)×(time) interactions and
(region of birth)×(age) interactions. Finally, we show that our results are robust to the inclusion
of direct measures of school quality.
Moreover, migration across US regions is substantial (Groen, 2004; Bound et al., 2004), and it
is unlikely to be random (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 1996; Dahl, 2002). Individuals who migrate
may not carry with them the average quality of their region of birth. However, it could happen
that migrants are diﬀerent from non-migrants due to self selection, but the quality of both groups
changes with average college enrolment at the same rate, in which case our estimates would not
be aﬀected. This would imply that changes in selective migration are uncorrelated with changes
in schooling. In Section 5, we argue and present evidence that in our basic speciﬁcation (where we
include a rich set of dummies as controls), the correlation between changes in selective migration
and schooling is likely to be small, and unimportant for our results.
Still, we implement diﬀerent corrective procedures. One alternative is to condition on migration
probabilities as in Dahl (2002). Following Dahl (2002), we estimate observed migration probabil-
ities and staying probabilities for each cell and add them as additional control variables. These
variables measure migration ﬂows across regions, which are likely to capture changes in relative
prices, and changes in the type of migrants. Another interpretation is that this procedure amounts
to estimating a selection model, although the exclusion restrictions are left implicit.9 A second
c.d.f. of −U. Notice that E (β|X,S = 1) = Xγ + E (β|X,P > V ). Changes in P result in changes in E (β|X,S = 1)
due to composition eﬀects. An alternative explanation that could also be consistent with the decline of the average
quality of college workers is that as a larger proportion of individuals go to college, educational resources could be
diluted, resulting in diminishing quality of average college attendees of the cohort. These two interpretations contain
diﬀerent policy implications; however, empirically, we would not be able to distinguish between them without further
information about the skill production process at college. We are grateful to an anonymous referee who suggested
the latter explanation.
9Migration probabilities (computed as the proportion of individuals in each cohort, time period and region of
birth, who work in each region of residence r) have identifying variation because we exclude (cohort)×(region of
residence)×(region of birth) interactions from the wage equations (as in Dahl, 2002). This procedure is justiﬁed
if movements in migration probabilities are caused by changes in the cost of migrating (implicit in these omitted
interactions) which are independent of wages, or changes in the beneﬁts of migrating which are orthogonal to changes
7alternative is to account for (region of birth)×(region of residence) interactions corresponding to
(region of birth)×(region of residence) matches (Heckman et al., 1996). We apply both procedures,
but we use the former as our base case.
None of these corrections has a strong impact on our estimates. In section 5 we present evidence
that changes in migration ﬂows (reﬂecting the quantity of migration) and migration premia (re-
ﬂecting the composition of migration) are uncorrelated with changes in schooling, which suggests
that selective migration is unlikely to be driving our results.
It is plausible to think that changes in selection into migration and changes in schooling are
uncorrelated, especially after accounting for all control variables (even though the levels of migration
and schooling are highly correlated in the cross section). The reason is that they respond to diﬀerent
prices (at diﬀerent points in time): while migration is driven by changes in relative prices, amenities,
and travelling costs across regions, schooling is mostly driven by changes in relative prices and costs
across schooling levels. Furthermore, much of the changes in prices are probably accounted for by
our procedure. If there is any remaining correlation, the direction of the bias can theoretically go
in diﬀerent directions.
In view of concerns raised above, we write νk
atrb (average quality of workers in a cell) as:
νk
atrb = γkab + γktb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr), (4)
where γkab and γktb are region-of-birth ﬁxed eﬀects which are separately interacted with age dum-
mies and year dummies (capturing school quality or other unobserved variation across regions of
birth), φk is a function of Pt−a,b (capturing the eﬀect of composition), and λk is a function of the
proportion of individuals migrating from region r to region b (Pk
M,atrb, what we call observed mi-
gration probability), and the proportion of individuals working in the same region where they were
born (Pk
M,atrr, what we call staying probability). Dahl (2002) proposed the use of the observed mi-
gration probability to account for selection, reinterpreting Lee (1983)’s idea that in the presence of
multiple alternatives, what matters is only the ﬁrst-best choice (that is, the observed choice among
multiple alternatives). Dahl (2002) calls this assumption “the index suﬃciency” and provides a
detailed discussion of this assumption. Dahl (2002) also suggests that staying probabilities should
in schooling because, say, they are unobserved at the time of the schooling decision (Meghir and Whitehouse (1994)
show that we can interpret our procedure as instrumenting migration probabilities with the omitted interactions).
Unfortunately we do not have in the Census variables that can serve as explicit exclusion restrictions.
8be used as additional controls since non-migrants can be substantially diﬀerent from migrants.10
Putting equations (3) and (4) together, we can estimate our object of interest (φk(Pt−a,b)) from
the following regression:
ωk
atrb = γkatr + γkab + γktb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr) (5)
where γkatr are full interactions of age-time-region ﬁxed eﬀects. The functions φk(.) and λk(.,.) are
speciﬁed in the empirical section.
In summary, by comparing wages of individuals born in diﬀerent regions but working in the same
labor market we identify diﬀerences in worker quality. We can then relate these to diﬀerences in
college participation across regions of birth, to determine how increases in college attainment aﬀect
average worker quality. This identiﬁcation strategy is similar to the one used by Card and Krueger
(1992) to study the impact of school quality on wages. While Card and Krueger (1992) relate wages
with school quality variables, we relate them with the proportion of individuals going to college
in each region. As noted before, it is unlikely that we are capturing school quality eﬀects through
our variable because of the set of controls we use (region of birth interacted with year and age).
Furthermore, in the empirical section, we examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of
direct measures of school quality.
2.2 Skill Prices in Equilibrium: Supply and Demand Framework
The model of the previous section allows us to obtain robust estimates of composition eﬀects, but
leaves the modelling of prices unspeciﬁed. In order to compare the role of composition with the roles
of supply and demand one needs a model for prices. We start from the model in Card and Lemieux
(2001), which we extend to account for composition eﬀects and regional labor markets.
2.2.1 Skill prices determination






are determined in equilibrium in a standard model of the
labor market. Suppose the aggregate output in period t, say Yt, is a sum of R regional outputs:




10In the sensitivity analysis reported in Section 5, we check the robustness of our main results without imposing
index suﬃciency (by conditioning on all possible migration probabilities).
9where Ytr is the aggregate output in region r and in period t, and R is the number of regions.
In addition, we assume that output in region r and in period t is a function of region-speciﬁc






These two labor aggregates are in turn functions of sub-aggregates of age-group-speciﬁc high-school
and college labor, denoted by Uk
1tr,...,Uk













atr are (respectively) the number of workers and the average quality of those
workers with schooling k, in age group a, in year t, and in region r. There is imperfect substitution
between high school and college labor, and between workers of diﬀerent ages (Card and Lemieux,
2001). The existing literature on this topic implicitly assumes that Qk
atr does not change as the
supply of college graduates varies.
We assume that Qk

















atrb is the number of workers in sector k for age a in time t in region of residence r and
in region of birth place b and Uk





i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1
￿
, the average level of k-type skill for individuals with
schooling level k in age group a in year t in region of residence r and in region of birth b. This
equation says that, for each (k,a,t,r) cell, the average worker quality in region r can be written as
the weighted average of the quality of workers born in diﬀerent regions b, but working in region r.
The weights are the proportion of workers in r born in region b.
A standard assumption in the literature is that labor markers are competitive in the sense that






































for each (k,a,t,r). By assumption, skill prices are speciﬁc to each (k,a,t,r) cell (which deﬁnes
a labor market), but common to all individuals in that cell regardless of their region of birth b
(individuals born in diﬀerent regions are perfect substitutes).
2.2.2 Identiﬁcation of the model for skill prices
In this section we discuss identiﬁcation of the parameters of the production function. There are
two main issues to consider, although they are fairly standard, so our discussion is brief. Recall
that, from the production function (for ﬁxed output prices) we can derive the implied demand for
each type of labor. It is useful to separate identiﬁcation of the relative demand for older vs. young
workers, and the relative demand for high school vs. college graduates.
We know that demand functions can be non-parametrically identiﬁed if i) the demand function
is stable and, ii) supply shifts are exogenous. Assumption ii) is very strong but it is standard in
this literature, and assumption i) is often found to be false. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992)
show that the college premium and the relative supply of college graduates trend upwards over
time, which means that the equilibrium cannot be moving along a stable demand curve. Therefore,
they conjecture that the demand for skill is trending upwards, due to skill biased technical change.
By analogy, it is natural to assume that the relative demand for older workers is not stable.11
The standard assumption (use throughout the paper) is that the demand for skill is stable up to
an additively separable trend. Still, knowing the direction of the trend is not suﬃcient for identiﬁ-
cation; one also needs to know the magnitude of the annual shifts. For example, Katz and Murphy
(1992) consider diﬀerent speciﬁcations, but the most popular one just has linear demand growth
(perhaps with a break in the 1990s, as in Autor et al., 2008).
Even if the demand function is non-parametrically identiﬁed, it is well known that eﬃciency
parameters and elasticities in (10) cannot be identiﬁed separately (see e.g. Diamond et al., 1978).
A standard practice in the literature is to allow for factor-augmenting technological progress, while
keeping the elasticity parameter ﬁxed over time. We follow this convention and furthermore, as in
11Card and Lemieux (2001) assume away the existence of such trend in the experience premium, but not in the
college premium.
11Card and Lemieux (2001), we assume that both the production function, and the high-school and

























where θktr is a factor-augmenting technology eﬃciency parameter for schooling group k in time
period t in region r, σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) (with ρ ≤ 1) is the elasticity of substitution between college
and high school labor, βat is a factor-augmenting technology eﬃciency parameter for age group a
in time period t, αka’s are time-constant, age-relative eﬃciency parameters for schooling group k,
and σk ≡ 1/(1−ηk) (with ηk ≤ 1) is the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent ages
but with the same schooling k.
Let ξkat = logβat + ηk logαka and let
ξktr = (1 − ρ)logYtr + logθktr + (ρ − ηk)logUk
tr. (12)
From equations (10) and (11) it follows that, in equilibrium:
πk







where ξktr is the (year)×(region of residence) ﬁxed eﬀect (corresponding to the ﬁrst two terms
in the right hand side of equation (10)), and ξkat is the (possibly time-varying) age eﬀect for
each schooling group k = H,C. Equation (13) states that skill prices, πk
atr, can be expressed as a
separable function of a time varying region-of-residence eﬀect (ξktr), a time varying age eﬀect (ξkat),






). This implies that
skill prices can change as quality (Qk
atr) varies, even if labor supply (Nk
atr) is kept ﬁxed. Therefore,
composition has a direct eﬀect on wages in each cell because it aﬀects the average quality of workers
in the cell, but it also has an indirect eﬀect through skill prices.
It is useful to discuss restrictions imposed in our CES model and to compare them with those




In contrast, the eﬃciency parameters for the age-by-schooling labor inputs are time invariant
parameters in Card and Lemieux (2001) (βat = βa for all t). However, allowing βat to have a
time-trend means that technological change can aﬀect the relative demand for older workers, as
12well as the relative demand for college graduates (θktr). In the literature, skill-biased technological
change tipically refers to changes in (θCtr/θHtr), although, in general, skills can be measured in
multiple dimensions. For example, the skill-biased technological change can manifest itself in terms
of changes in eﬃciency parameters for skills measured by age (increasing demand for experience).12
2.2.3 Estimation of the model
This section describes our method for estimating the model. It is diﬃcult to estimate wage equations
based on (13). To see this, notice that Qk













i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1
￿
.




i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1
￿
as
functions of Pi,t−a,b, for all b. This procedure would require including nine diﬀerent Pi,t−a,b (non-
linearly) in the regression (corresponding to nine diﬀerent regions of birth), which could lead to
problems of multicolinearity.
Our solution to this diﬃculty is to use the wage structure assumed in (1) to reduce the number
of variables (Pi,t−a,b) that we need to include in the regression. Notice that (1) implies that for any
two diﬀerent regions of birth, say b′ and b′′, the relative quality across diﬀerent groups of individuals























i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1
￿, (14)
since workers living in the same region face the same skill prices (Πk
atr is non-random conditional
on Sk
i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1). Notice that the left-hand side of (14) is unobservable, but the
right-hand side is observable from the data. Equation (14) provides the basis for our estimation
method.
To be more speciﬁc about our implementation, re-write (9) as
Qk










12In our empirical results, it turns out that this departure from the model of Card and Lemieux (2001) has little

























In words, we normalize Qk
atr by the quality of the group of workers who were born in region r, and
we call this quantity ˜ Qk






















































which can be estimated directly by sample analogs using Census data.
To complete the description of Qk














where Γkb is region-of-birth ﬁxed eﬀects, Φk is a function of Pt−a,b (composition), and Λk is a
function of Pk
M,atrb and Pk
M,atrr (migration). The exponential function is used to ensure that the
conditional expectation on the left-hand side of (16) is always positive. The underlying ideas behind
(16) are the same as in (4): the average quality of workers can diﬀer because of region-of-birth
ﬁxed eﬀects, diﬀerences in composition captured by Pt−a,b, and selective migration.13 Finally:
Qk
atr = ˜ Qk
atr exp
h






Using this expression of Qk
atr, one can estimate a model of the demand for skill based on (13).
Putting (3), (4), (13) and (17) together we can estimate ηk and φk (Pt−a,b) (as well as βat, αka,
and Φk (Pt−a,r)) from the following model:
ωk















+γkab + γktb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr) (18)
13Notice that Γkb and Λk are diﬀerent from γkab, γktb, and λk. Strictly speaking, (16) is not directly compatible
to (4) since in general, E[logY |X] ≤ logE[Y |X] for random variables Y and X (Jensen’s inequality).
14We are left with the estimation of ρ, which is subsumed in ξktr (see equation (12)). If assumptions
are placed on demand growth then the parameter ρ can be estimated in a second-stage procedure
with estimates of ηk, βat, αka, Φk, and φk as inputs to the second-stage estimation. Another
alternative is to take an estimate of ρ from the literature and then back out the trend in demand.
3 Data
We use data from the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Censuses (1% sample).14 We focus on
white males, ages 25 to 60, and we aggregate them into 7 age groups: 25-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45,
46-50, 51-55, 56-60. We consider 9 regions of birth and 9 regions of residence,15 and we drop from
the sample those individuals who are foreign born. We group individuals into cells deﬁned by ﬁve
variables: schooling (high school or college), year, age group, region of residence, and region of
birth. The reason we do not use the state as the regional unit is that the resulting cell sizes would
be too small for our estimates to be reliable.
For each cell we compute the relevant average weekly log wages, log total weeks worked (a
measure of labor supply) and the proportion of individuals in college (a measure of composition).
The construction of wages and weeks worked described in this section is based on Card and Lemieux
(2001). Weekly wages for high school graduates are obtained by taking only white males with
exactly 12 years of schooling and dividing annual income from wages by annual weeks worked.
Weekly wages for college graduates are obtained in an analogous way, but considering individuals
with exactly 16 years of schooling.16 Unfortunately, for the 1960 and 1970 US Censuses weeks
worked are only available in intervals: 1 to 13, 24 to 26, 27 to 39, 40 to 47, 48 to 49, 50 to 52. For
these two years we take the midpoint of each interval as our estimate of weeks worked.
Log weeks worked by high school equivalents are a weighted sum of weeks worked by white
males in each region of residence, who can be high school dropouts, high school graduates, and
individuals with some college. Log weeks worked by college equivalents are a weighted sum of weeks
14Our data was extracted from http://www.ipums.umn.edu/ (see Ruggles et al., 2004)
15We use the regions deﬁned by the Census: New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont), Middle Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania), East North Central (Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin), West North Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota), South Atlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia), East South Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee), West
South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas), Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming), Paciﬁc (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington). Diﬀerent regions have
diﬀerent sizes, but we do not see this as a major problem for our analysis.
16Notice that in order to get measures of wages for clearly deﬁned and relatively homogeneous groups of individuals
we ignore high school dropouts, those with some college, those with post-graduate studies.
15worked by white males with some college, a college degree, or post-graduate studies.
The weights for these sums are deﬁned as follows. Each high school dropout week is only a
fraction of a regular high school graduate week. This fraction corresponds to the relative wage
of high school dropouts and high school graduates. Similarly, each week worked by an individual
with a post-graduate degree has a larger weight than a week worked by a college graduate, and
the weight is given by the relative wage of post-graduates and college graduates. Finally, in order
to construct the weights for some college weeks, we ﬁrst look at the diﬀerence between high school
graduate and college graduate wages. If the diﬀerence between some college wages and high school
graduate wages is say, one third of the diﬀerence between college and high school wages, then we
assign one third of some college weeks to high school, and two thirds to college. We allow these
weights to vary across age groups, but not across year or region.
We have one additional variable relative to those considered in Card and Lemieux (2001): com-
position. Composition is measured by (a function of) the proportion of individuals with some
college or more in each cell. This proportion should vary only with cohort and region of birth.
However, empirically it varies over time, even within cohort-region of birth cells, because individ-
uals acquire more education as they age (during their adult years), or because of (time varying)
sampling error or measurement error. Therefore, in order to get a measure of composition which
is ﬁxed within cohort and cohort-region of birth cell, we average this number across years using as
weights the proportion of people in each cell.
In order to have a clear idea of the sources of identiﬁcation in the model, it is helpful to
understand the level of variation of diﬀerent variables. Wages vary across schooling-year-age-region
of residence-region of birth cells (unrestricted variation). Weeks worked vary across schooling-year-
age-region of residence, and are constructed by adding weeks across regions of birth (therefore
they are constant across cells corresponding to diﬀerent regions of birth but the same region of
residence). Composition varies across cohort-region of birth (constant across regions of residence,
for the same region of birth). The deﬁnition of these variables conforms with the reasoning behind
our identiﬁcation strategy: skill prices are constant within region of residence and are aﬀected by
total labor supply in the region of residence, while composition is constant within region of birth
(subject to assumptions on migration, which we further discuss in Sections 4 and 5).
In our setup, a migrant is an individual who resides in a region diﬀerent from the region he was
born in. Migration proportions are constructed simply by counting the number of individuals of
16schooling group k, age a, year t, born in b and residing in r, and dividing by the total number of
individuals of schooling group k, age a, year t, born in b, independently of their region of residence.
Figure 2 shows the basic features of our data, which we present after grouping the nine Census
regions into four more aggregate regions: Northeast (New England + Middle Atlantic), North
Central (East North Central + West North Central), South (South Atlantic + East South Central
+ West South Central), and West (Mountain + Paciﬁc). The ﬁrst panel shows that the trend in
the college premium, measured by the average diﬀerence in log wages of college and high school
graduates, is qualitatively similar across regions, although there are diﬀerences in the levels. The
college premium rises in the 1960s, declines in the 1970s, accelerates in the 1980s and continues
growing in the 1990s but at a slower rate, except in the Northeast where the growth in the college
premium in the 1990s is comparable to that in the 1980s.
The college age premium (shown in the second panel), measured by the diﬀerence in average
log wages of 51-55 and 31-35 year old college graduates, increases in the 1970s in all regions, and
declines in the 1990s in all regions. It is stable during the 1980s in the northern regions, but it
declines during this decade both in the South and in the West. The high school age premium
(shown in the third panel) increases throughout the 1970s and 1980s for all regions, and then it
seems to stagnate or decline slightly. Notice also that the movements in the age premium we
document are as large as the movements in the college premium. More generally, changes in age
premia are as important as changes in the college premium for the evolution of inequality. In other
words, movements in the age premia are of the same order of magnitude as movements in the
college premium. Between 1960 and 2000, the college premium increased by 17% in our data, while
the 5, 10 and 20 year age premia (relative to the 31-35 year old age group) grew respectively by
7%, 7% and 6% among college graduates, and 6%, 8%, and 17% among high school graduates.17
Finally, the last panel of the ﬁgure shows the evolution of the proportion of college graduates
in each region. Even though there are clear regional diﬀerences in the levels of this variable, with
the South presenting lower numbers than the other three regions, the trends are the same across
the US: college enrollment increases over time, but it grows at a lower rate starting in the 1980s.
These basic trends are well documented in the literature. It is reassuring to see that our data
replicates these well known patterns, and it is interesting to see that there are strong commonalities
across diﬀerent regions.
17We could have picked another age contrast as our main example. A full study of the age premium is available
on request from the authors, and is omitted here for brevity.
174 Empirical Results
Table 1 reports estimation results that are obtained by implementing the econometric framework
described in Section 2. All regressions in the table are weighted by the inverse of the sampling
variance of average log wages in each cell and robust standard errors are reported in brackets,
clustered on the schooling-region of residence-year cell.
In column (1) of Table 1, we estimate the reduced-form model of equation (5). In this model
πk
tar is not modelled explicitly. Instead, we control for skill prices using full interactions between
year, age and region of residence dummies in separate regressions for college and high school. In
doing so, we estimate the role of composition by putting as little structure as possible on price
determination. In the empirical implementation of (5), we assume that φk is linear in the odds of
proportion in college ( ˜ Pt−a,b := Pt−a,b/(1 − Pt−a,b)). This functional-form choice is arbitrary, but
it gives a convenient parametrization (it is a strictly increasing function of Pt−a,b and can vary 0
to ∞).18 In addition, λk in (5) is modelled as a second-order expansion of migration probabilities:
that is, linear and quadratic terms of Pk
M,atrb and Pk
M,atrr and the interaction between the two. All
regressions include region of birth dummies interacted with year and age, separately.19
Column (1) of Table 1 shows that the coeﬃcient on ˜ Pt−a,b is signiﬁcantly negative and quan-
titatively large for the college equation,20 but insigniﬁcantly negative and quantitatively small for
the high school equation. This means that, for ﬁxed prices, log college wages respond substantially
to changes in college enrollment, but that is not the case with log high school wages. We estimate
that when the proportion of college participants increases from 50% to 60% ( ˜ Pt−a,b increases from
1 to 1.5) average college wages decline by about 4.25%. We interpret this as a decline in average
worker quality. Composition plays a much smaller role in the high school sector than in the college
sector. This may happen for several reasons. For example, the skills that determine selection into
college may be less valued in high school type occupations than in college type occupations. This
is possible in a model of the labor market in which there are two or more types of skills, as opposed
18We carried out estimation of the reduced-form model of equation (5) using alternative speciﬁcations of φk. The
main qualitative results of the paper are the same regardless of the speciﬁcation of φk. See Figure A.6 for details.
19Therefore, we control for region of birth speciﬁc cohort trends, as well as time-varying region of birth eﬀects.
Recall that these dummies were denoted by γkab and γktb in (5).
20As an alternative speciﬁcation, we included the odds of college participation as well as the odds of college
graduation as quality variables along with other covariates in column (1) of Table 1. In this speciﬁcation, the
coeﬃcient for the odds of college participation was −0.091 with a robust standard error of 0.033 and the coeﬃcient
for the odds of college graduation was 0.059 with a robust standard error of 0.255. This result is qualitatively
consistent with the result reported in column (1) of Table 1. Since the odds of the college graduation is insigniﬁcant
at any conventional level, we excluded this variable from our main speciﬁcations.
18to a model with a single type of skill.
From Table 1 we can also infer the role of composition for the trend in the college premium, one
of the main goals of our paper. Since the college premium at time t is deﬁned as E
￿
wC






t |SH = 1
￿
, this requires subtracting the college and high school wage equations and averaging
across all ages, regions of birth and regions of residence. Given that our speciﬁcation of the
high school and college wage equations is linear in all variables, in order to compute the eﬀect of
composition on the college premium we just need to take the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients on
˜ Pt−a,b in the college and high school equations. In column (1) of Table 1, this diﬀerence is equal to
-0.074, implying that the college premium would decline by 3.7% if college enrollment went from
50% to 60%.21 Our estimate also implies that an increase of college enrollment from 30% to 60%
(the magnitude similar to that observed between 1960 and 2000) leads to a 8% decline of college
premium. One important implication of our ﬁndings is that the trend in the college premium is
contaminated by composition eﬀects, an issue we explore in the next section.
In column (2) of Table 1, we estimate a supply-demand model where πk
tar is modelled explicitly
as in (18). For comparison, in column (3) of Table 1, we estimate a model without logQk
atr in (13).
This corresponds to the standard model in the literature where we ignore changes in the quality
of workers and interpret ﬂuctuations in wages as being driven exclusively by changes in prices. In
both columns (2) and (3), the age eﬀect ξkat is modelled as an interaction of a quadratic time trend
with age speciﬁc dummies that are common between schooling groups.22 In column (2), Φk in
(17) is assumed to be linear in the odds of proportion in college. It is not necessary to specify the
term Λk separately because when b = r, Λk is only a function of Pk
M,atrr and can be absorbed into
λk in (4). In summary, explanatory variables in estimating column (2) are odds of proportion in
college ( ˜ Pt−a,b), quality-adjusted log weeks (Nk
atr ˜ Qk
atr), the (year)×(region of residence) ﬁxed eﬀect
(ξktr), the age eﬀect interacted by common quadratic time trends (ξkat), odds of proportion in
college for stayers (Φk(Pt−a,b)), the region-of-birth ﬁxed eﬀect for stayers (Γkb), the (year)×(region
of birth) ﬁxed eﬀect (γktb), the (age)×(region of birth) ﬁxed eﬀect (γkab), and linear, quadratic, and
interaction terms of observed migration probability and staying probability (λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr)).
When estimating column (3), quality-unadjusted log weeks (Nk
atr) are used instead of the quality-
21Table A.14 in the appendix simulates the eﬀects of declining quality of marginal college graduates on their average
log wages for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model, and at diﬀerent levels of P.
22We have chosen this speciﬁcation instead of a more ﬂexible one because we are concerned about overparametriza-
tion of the model and also unrestricted interactions between age and time dummies for each schooling group lead to
imprecise coeﬃcients in quality-adjusted and unadjusted log weeks in columns (2) and (3), respectively.
19adjusted log weeks, and the quality-related variables ( ˜ Pt−a,b, Φk(Pt−a,b), and Γkb) are excluded
from the regression.
In column (2), we can see that the coeﬃcients on ˜ Pt−a,b in the college and high school equations
are not very diﬀerent from those in the more general model of column (1). Speciﬁcally, in column
(2), the diﬀerence between two coeﬃcients is −0.076, which is very similar to −0.074 in column
(1). Thus, our estimation results are robust to alternative models for πk
tar. In the college equation,
the coeﬃcient for the quality-adjusted log weeks (ηC − 1) in (13) is -0.094, which implies that
the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent ages in college is σC = 1/(1 − ηC) =
1/0.094 ≈ 10.6. In the high school equation, the corresponding coeﬃcient (ηH − 1) is −0.114 and,
therefore, the elasticity of substitution is about 8.8. Thus, our estimates indicate that diﬀerent
age groups are slightly closer substitutes in college than in high school (equivalently, high school
wages are slightly more sensitive to labor supply than college wages). However, their diﬀerence is
not statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level.
Looking at column (3), we see that the coeﬃcients for (quality-unadjusted) log wages in college
and high school are −0.162 and −0.121, respectively, implying that the elasticities of substitution
are about 6.2 and 8.3 in college and high school, respectively. Hence, failing to adjust for changes in
the quality of labor supply has a substantial eﬀect on our estimate of the elasticity of substitution
across age groups in college (σC). Movements in the number of weeks worked by college graduates
confound changes in the supply of college labor and changes in the composition of college labor.
The two eﬀects go in the same direction, and therefore the estimate of the eﬀect of college labor on
college wages is upward biased (in absolute value) if quality is not controlled for. However, there
is little diﬀerence between the two estimates in the high school equation, which is not surprising
since the composition eﬀect is not important in high school.23
5 Sensitivity Analysis
Since the main focus of our paper is the magnitude of composition eﬀects and they can be estimated
from the reduced form model, we focus our sensitivity analysis on the reduced form model. In
Table 2 we examine how results change when we drop one of the nine regions at a time from the
sample, to check whether results are driven by one region alone as opposed to being a national
23Our estimates in column (3) are comparable to those in Card and Lemieux (2001, Table VII), although they
are slightly lower in absolute values. It is reassuring that our estimates in column (3) are similar to those in the
literature.
20phenomenon. The table has 10 columns. The ﬁrst one corresponds to our original speciﬁcation,
where all regions are included, and in the remaining ones we drop from the sample one region at
a time. Across columns, the coeﬃcient of interest in the college equation is always negative and
statistically signiﬁcant, while in the high school equation the coeﬃcient is small and insigniﬁcant.
In Table 3 we examine the sensitivity of our results to dropping one year at a time.24 In the
ﬁrst column of the table we present the original speciﬁcation, while in the remaining ﬁve columns
we drop from the sample one year at a time. Across columns there are hardly any changes in the
coeﬃcient of interest, both in the college and in the high school equation.
We do not know what should be the correct functional form for φk(Pt−a,b) in equation (5).
Therefore, in the ﬁrst panel of Table 4 we experiment with four alternatives. The ﬁrst column















and we report ψ1, ψ2, and the p-value of the test of joint signiﬁcance of these two parameters. In
the third column,
φk(Pt−a,b) = ψPt−a,b,
and in the fourth column,
φk(Pt−a,b) = ψ1Pt−a,b + ψ2P2
t−a,b.
The ﬁrst panel of the table corresponds to the original sample of white males, and show that we
ﬁnd strong eﬀects of composition for alternative speciﬁcations of φk(Pt−a,b).
In the remaining panels of this table we show the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent samples.
We start with an alternative white male sample, where we exclude all those individuals who work
in farms, or work less than 30 hours a week. With this sample, results are similar to the ones we
obtain with the original sample, except that in column 3 the coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant at a 10%
level. The next panel corresponds to a sample of white females. The main reason why we chose to
24If we estimate the model decade by decade the coeﬃcient on variable of interest is always negative but not
statistically signiﬁcant.
21focus on males rather than females was that female non-employment rates in our sample are, on
average, three to four times higher than male non-employment rates. If that is the case, we need
to worry not only about shifts in the composition of schooling, but also shifts in the composition
of employment (Blundell et al., 2003; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008). The only signiﬁcant results
in the college equation are in column 4, suggesting that there may be composition eﬀects, but not
as robust as in the male sample. The results seem to indicate that increases in college attainment
initially bring into college females of lower quality than average, but as college attainment increases
this becomes less and less true. In the high school equation no coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Finally, in the last panel, we group males and females together in the same sample.
Results are similar to the original ones, especially in columns 1 and 2. In columns 3 and 4 the
quality decline that results from an increase in Pt−a,b is more pronounced than in the original
sample.
One purpose of this section is also to study the potential confounding role of selective migration
and school quality in our empirical work. If migration is selective then migrants may not carry with
them the average quality of their region of birth. This is not important if changes in composition
aﬀect the quality of migrants and non-migrants in a parallel way, but it becomes problematic if these
two groups are aﬀected diﬀerently. Recall that our reduced form model includes: year×age×region
of residence, year×region of birth, and age×region of birth (on top of migration ﬂows, which
we ignore for now). Therefore, our estimates would be biased if, within region of birth, cohort
changes in selective migration are correlated with cohort changes in composition. In theory this is
a possibility, but the question is whether it is empirically important.
In our search for valid correction criteria, we studied this question in detail. Based on three
diﬀerent sets of results that will be discussed below, we conclude that it is unlikely that selective
migration explains our ﬁndings. Of course, without a valid instrument for migration this is an
untestable proposition, and therefore each of these results on its own can be merely suggestive of
our claim. However, taken together, they provide a strong case for it.
First, we show that the inclusion of alternative sets of controls for selective migration does
not aﬀect our basic results. The reason is not that these variables do not aﬀect wages, quite the
contrary. What happens is that these variables (given the set of controls) are uncorrelated with
changes in schooling. Table 5 summarizes these results. In this table, we experiment alternative
speciﬁcations for column (1) of Table 1, where prices are modelled as full interactions between year,
22age and region of residence dummies. Column (1) of Table 5 considers the simplest speciﬁcation,
where we add as controls region of birth interacted with year and age, to account for omitted
variable bias caused by heterogeneity across regions of birth.25 This is the ﬁrst speciﬁcation in our
table against which it is useful to compare the remaining columns. Column (2) expands the set of
region of birth eﬀects by adding a region of birth speciﬁc nonlinear cohort eﬀect.26 This amounts
to including a quadratic “cohort trend” in the model, as a parametric way of accounting for region
of birth speciﬁc cohort eﬀects that evolve smoothly across cohorts. The resulting change in the
coeﬃcients of interest both in high school and college is quite small.
In Column (3) we attempt to control for selective migration more explicitly by including region of
residence and region of birth interactions, and allowing them to vary with year. With these variables
we intend to capture match speciﬁc shocks that can be time varying, and more importantly, changes
in the quality of (region of birth)-(region of residence) migrants over time. Relative to Column (1),
there is a decline in the coeﬃcient of interest in college but again it is small, and almost no change
in high school.
Column (4) is the main speciﬁcation of the paper (and replicates Column (1) of table 1). Rela-
tively to Column (1) we add a basic set of migration probabilities, as discussed above. In particular,
for each (k,a,t,r,b) cell we include the proportion of individuals born in b and residing in b (stay-
ing probability), the proportion born in b and residing in r (observed migration probability), their
squares and an interaction between the two (Dahl, 2002). What is most striking about this column
is that the results are similar to Column (1), although the coeﬃcients on the migration proportion
are highly signiﬁcant (jointly). This suggests that changes in migration ﬂows are uncorrelated with
changes in schooling in our basic speciﬁcation, an issue we explore below.
The remaining columns present variants of these ﬁrst four speciﬁcations. In Column (5) we
join the speciﬁcations in (3) and (4). In column (6) we take the main speciﬁcation of the paper
in column (4) but estimate it only for migrant cells (cells for whom b  = r). This column shows
that our results are not driven by diﬀerences between migrant and non-migrant cells. Instead, they
seem to be driven by variation in composition across migrant cells.
25It is interesting to note that if these variables are ignored then the coeﬃcient of interest becomes positive and
signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the college equation (an estimate of 0.037 with a clustered standard error of 0.020).
This is not true in the high school equation (an estimate of 0.013 with a clustered standard error of 0.013). This is
probably because regions of birth with larger resources have better quality schools, leading simultaneously to higher
earnings potential among their students and also larger college enrollment rates. This illustrates the importance of
accounting for region of birth eﬀects.
26A linear cohort eﬀect, (Cohort)×(Region of Birth), is implicitly included since (Cohort) = (Year) - (Age).
23Finally, in column (7), we add school quality variables as additional controls compared to the
basic speciﬁcation. The included school quality variables are pupil-teacher ratio, average term
length, and relative teacher salary, as in Card and Krueger (1992) and Heckman et al. (1996).27
One concern with the basic speciﬁcation in column (4) is that we may be capturing school quality
eﬀects through the proportion in college. It can be seen that diﬀerences between estimates in
columns (4) and (8) are small, indicating that our results are robust to inclusion of school quality
variables. We conjecture that this is because variation in school quality is already accounted for by
the set of controls we use in the basic speciﬁcation (region of birth interacted with year and age).
Our second set of results builds on the comparison between Columns (1) and (4) above, which
show that the inclusion or exclusion of migration ﬂows as control variables does not change our
main results. This means that changes in migration ﬂows and changes in schooling across cohorts
are orthogonal. In fact, when we examined the raw data, we found that even though there have
been large increases in college attainment over the last 40 years, there were hardly any changes in
aggregate migration ﬂows, both in college and in high school. Therefore, it is unlikely that selective
migration varies with schooling because migration ﬂows (as opposed to schooling ﬂows) are roughly
constant over time, although the composition of migrants could still be correlated with schooling.
We explore these two issues more formally next.
In Table 6, we examine diﬀerences between including and excluding migration probabilities in
our basic speciﬁcation. In column (1), we reproduce estimates for the college sector from column
(4) of Table 5, but we present coeﬃcients for the migration probabilities as well. In column (2),
we show the estimate of odds in proportion in college without controlling for selective migration
(hence, this is the same as the speciﬁcation in column (1) of Table 5). In column (3), we show
the estimates for migration probabilities without controlling for proportion in college. In columns
(4)-(6), we show corresponding estimates for the high school sector. The coeﬃcients for proportion
in college are almost identical whether or not migration probabilities are controlled for. Similarly,
coeﬃcients for migration probabilities change only a little if we do not control for proportion in
college. This conﬁrms our assertion that migration ﬂows are orthogonal to changes in schooling.
In order to examine this more directly, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, we regress the
proportion of individuals not migrating in each cell on the odds in proportion in college. We use
27Petra Todd kindly provided us with these variables for several states and years. For each individual in the Census,
we gathered the values of each school quality variable for the state he was born in, and for the years in which he
was between 6 and 17 years of age, and we averaged them. We assigned this as the level of school quality for each
individual in the data, and then we averaged these values within each (k,a,t,b) cell.
24only non-migrant cells. In column (1), no control variable is used and in column (2), (Year)×(Age),
(Year)×(Region of Birth), and (Age)×(Region of Birth) dummies are controlled for (as in our base
speciﬁcation). There is no signiﬁcant correlation between schooling and migration ﬂows in college.
The regression coeﬃcient in high school is signiﬁcant even after including the full set of controls,
but its magnitude is very small. Similarly, in columns (3) and (4), we use only migrant cells to test
whether the odds in proportion in college is correlated with the observed migration probability.
In column (3), no variable is controlled for and in column (4), usual basic control variables are
used. Once again, after including the full set of controls, there is no evidence of any correlation
between migration ﬂows and college attainment. In columns (1)-(4), all regressions are weighted
by the inverse of the sampling variance of the dependent variable using the fact that the dependent
variable is a probability in each column.
These results show that migration ﬂows respond very little to schooling, which means that
selective migration is unlikely to vary with schooling. However, it is possible that the composition
of migrants is correlated with variation in schooling, even if the size of the migration ﬂows is not.
If this were true, we might expect changes in the raw migration premium (the average diﬀerence
between logs wages for migrants and those for stayers) to be correlated with changes in college
attainment, since this parameter will be sensitive to changes in the composition of migrants. In
order to check this possibility, in columns (5)-(7), we regress the migration premium on the odds
of proportion in college. In these columns, all regressions are weighted by the same weights used
in Table 1. In column (5) when no variable is controlled for, there is a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of
college attainment on the migration premium; however, this eﬀect disappears in columns (6) and
(7) when we introduce our basic set of controls. Therefore it is unlikely that changes in schooling
are correlated with changes in the composition of migrants.
Selective migration is undoubtedly important and may be present in our data even after includ-
ing our set of controls. However, we believe that, taken together, the results of Tables 5, 6, and 7
provide convincing evidence that selective migration does not substantially aﬀect our results..
In Appendix A.3 we present additional speciﬁcation checks (unrelated to migration). First, we
show that our results are robust to the use of an alternative measure of composition (P, instead of
P
1−P ). Second, since we aggregate individuals into two levels of schooling only, one may worry that
changes in college attainment also lead to changes in composition within each of these aggregates
(between dropouts and high school graduates, those with some college and college graduates, or
25those between college graduates and post-college-educated workers). We show that our basic results
are unchanged once we include measures of within group composition (the odds of proportion in
dropout within the high school sector, the odds of proportion in some college within the college
sector, and the odds of proportion in post college enrollment). Third, we rerun our models using
diﬀerent dependent variables besides log weekly wages. We show that declines in the quality of
college workers due to increases in college attainment show up not only in wages, but also in total
income and in an index of occupational status.
6 Direct Evidence on Declining Quality of College Workers
In this section we study the relationship between cognitive test scores of college attendees and the
proportion attending college across regions of the US. We start by analyzing data from the original
cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Males (NLS66), the National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth of 1979 (NLSY79), and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1997
(NLSY97). For simplicity, we present results comparing only North and South, but we have avail-
able results for ﬁner regional partitions which show similar patterns. We take white males, and we
divide them in two groups: those growing up in the southern regions of the US, and those growing
up elsewhere. For each individual in each region we compute his percentile in the distribution of
test scores within region (the AFQT in the NLSY79 and NLSY97, and IQ in NLS66).28 Finally,
we divide the sample into those with some college or more, and those with less than college, and
calculate the average percentile in the test score distribution for each education group and region.
The question we ask is: in regions where college participation is higher is the average college student
in a lower percentile of the within-region test score distribution?
Results are shown in table 8. The number in each cell in columns (1) and (2) corresponds to the
average percentile in the within-region test score distribution for each dataset, region and schooling
group. Columns (3) and (4) show the proportion of individuals in each sample with at least some
college, and the corresponding odds. For example, in the NLSY79 the college participation rate
is 56% in the North and 48% in the South, and the average percentile of college student in the
within-region test score distribution is 64% in the North and 69% in the South. Therefore, in
the North, where the levels of college attendance are higher, the average college student has lower
quality (relatively to the other residents in the region) than in the South, where levels of college
28We use schooling corrected AFQT in the NLSY79, as in Carneiro et al. (2007).
26attendance are lower. This is also true in NLS66 and NLSY97. Notice that percentiles of the test
score distribution are taken within region, not across regions, because there could be systematic
diﬀerences in test scores across regions which we want to abstract from. The question we ask is
whether, in regions with high college participation, college students have lower ability relatively to
other residents in the region than in regions with low college participation.
One could ask whether the magnitude of these test score diﬀerences is enough to explain the
wage diﬀerences we observe in the Census. If we regress log hourly wages in 1994 on within
region AFQT percentile for white males in the NLSY79 with some college and residing in the
North we get a coeﬃcient of about 0.5 (and essentially the same coeﬃcient, 0.6, if we use those
in the South instead). This magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient translates to an increase of
about 14.4% (= 0.5 × 28.8%, where 28.8% is the standard deviation of within region percentile
test scores) in hourly wages with respect to the one standard deviation increase in the AFQT
percentile. This estimate is within the range of previous estimates for the return to the test
scores. For example, Bishop (1989) ﬁnds that a one standard deviation increase in test score is
associated with a 19% increase in earnings for male household heads using data from the 1971
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (see equation (3) of Bishop, 1989); Neal and Johnson (1996)
report an estimate of about 17% increase (see Column 3 of Table 1 of Neal and Johnson, 1996);
Murnane et al. (1995) obtain an estimate of about 8% increase with respect to the one standard
deviation increase in the mathematics score using data from High School and Beyond (see tables
2 and 3 Murnane et al., 1995). Our estimation result from NLSY79 means that the diﬀerence
of 5 percentile points between those college participants residing in the South and those residing
elsewhere, corresponds to a diﬀerence in wages of 2.5 percentage points (= 0.5×5%) if we use the
estimate from the North (3 percentage points, respectively, if we use the estimate from the South).
Given that the college participation rates are 48% in the South and 56% elsewhere, if we were to use
our estimates of equation (5), we would expect college wages to be about 3 percentile points higher
in the south than elsewhere (0.085 × a diﬀerence of 0.35 in the odds of P). These magnitudes are
reassuringly similar to each other. This provides suggestive and direct evidence that increases in
college attainment lead to declines in the quality of college attendees.
We also examine average scores on the SAT by state. As illustrated in Figure 3, test taking
rates vary widely across states, and states with a large proportion of SAT takers have low average
test results, because they test more students from the bottom of the distribution of student quality.
27For example, in 2004 New York had the sixth lowest average verbal SAT score (497) and the highest
proportion of high school graduates taking the SAT (92%), while North Dakota had the ﬁfth highest
verbal score (590) and the lowest SAT test taking rate in the US (4%). Figure 3 does not control
for other possible confounding factors. For example, some states take SAT mainly, whereas other
states take ACT mainly. To carry out a more formal analysis, we have collected average verbal
and math SAT scores for high school seniors graduating in each state from 1993 to 2004. Our
main explanatory variable is the proportion of high school seniors taking the SAT in each state and
year (as opposed to the proportion of college graduates among those graduating from high school,
since we observe SAT scores for those taking the SAT, regardless of whether they attend college or
not). For the years we are analyzing, the proportion of SAT takers is very strongly correlated with
the fraction of graduating from four year colleges, but not as much correlated with the fraction
graduating from two year college (perhaps because the SAT is needed for enrollment in four but
not two year colleges).
Using this dataset, we run a regression of SAT math and verbal test scores on the percentage of
high school seniors taking the test. Our speciﬁcation is quite demanding, since we control for both
year and state dummies. The estimation results reported in Table 9 show exactly the same pattern
reported in ﬁgure 3. We ﬁnd that an increase in the proportion of high school seniors taking the
SAT is signiﬁcantly associated with lower math and verbal scores. This provides additional direct
evidence that increases in college attainment lead to declines in the quality of college attendees.
Finally, we consider the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), which is a literacy survey
administered in several OECD countries. The US sample consists of a random sample of adults
aged 16-65 surveyed in 1994-1995. Three literacy tests were administered: Quantitative, Document
and Prose. The survey also collects data on individual schooling attainment, among many other
variables (see OECD, 2000). We restrict our analysis to the quantitative score of individuals aged
25-60 (our results are not sensitive to the test we use). We standardize the score so that it has
mean 0 and variance 1. The quantitative test measures individual proﬁciency in basic quantitative
tasks: “the knowledge and skills required to apply arithmetic operations, either alone or sequen-
tially, to numbers embedded in printed materials, such as balancing a checkbook, calculating a tip,
completing an order form, or determining the amount of interest on a loan from an advertisement”.
For each cohort, we group individuals into two schooling groups: high school or less, and some
college or more. Then we compute the percentage of individuals with some college or above, which
28call P. Table 10 reports the coeﬃcients of a regression of quantitative literacy on age, age squared
and P, for the high school and college groups separately, and for the whole sample together.
The coeﬃcient on P is negative and strong for college, and insigniﬁcant for high school. The
third column of Table 10 shows what happens when we run the regression for the whole sample,
including an indicator for college attendance (because college attendance may aﬀect literacy). The
coeﬃcient on P is zero, indicating that there are no intrinsic diﬀerences in the ability distribution
across cohorts, except diﬀerences in composition.29
In short, we have used data from the NLS66, NLSY79, NLSY97, SAT, and IALS to show that
empirical results from several diﬀerent sources are all consistent with our main hypothesis.
7 Quality-Adjusted Trends in the College and Age Premia
In this section, we construct quality-adjusted trends in the college and age premia. In order to do
so, for each year we need to construct average college and age premia across age, region of birth
and region of residence cells. We deﬁne the college premium, denoted by CPt, as the diﬀerence
between average log college and high school wages. An age premium for each schooling k, denoted
by APk














































where o and y denotes old and young workers, respectively, and fk
t (a,r,b) is the proportion of
individuals in cell (a,r,b) for each schooling group k and time t. There does not seem to be a
standard deﬁnition of young and old workers in the literature. In our empirical work, we set the
young workers to be those in age group 25-30 and consider three diﬀerent age premia using age
groups, 36-40, 46-50, and 56-60 as old workers.
In order to deﬁne quality-adjusted college and age premia, recall that average log wages for
29In order to explore further this issue, we estimated the quantiles of literacy conditional on age and age squared,
and a third order polynomial in P. We ﬁnd that the decline in literacy is mainly at the bottom of the college
distribution.
29each cell are modelled as:
ωk
atrb = πk
atr + γkab + γktb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr). (20)





atr + γkab + γktb + φk(P1960−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr). (21)





















































atrb corresponds to the average wage that we would observe in each cell if average worker
quality were kept ﬁxed at its 1960 level. Variation in ω
k,Q
atrb over time is purely due to changes in
prices, which are caused by ﬂuctuations in the demand and supply of skill. ω
k,Q
atrb is an abstract
construction since it is impossible to vary the supply of labor without changing its composition,
unless selection into schooling is random.
Notice that the level of ω
k,Q
atrb is still aﬀected by selection. This happens because we ﬁx quality
of type k at the level of the average worker who self-selected into schooling level k in 1960 (thus,








a1960rb). In this paper we do not intend to estimate measures of ωk
atrb, and of the
college and age premia, purged of selection. Our more modest goal is to keep selection ﬁxed, so
that we can interpret movements in wages as reﬂecting solely movements in prices. The reason
why we do not try to purge the level ωk
atrb completely from selection is that we do not have enough
variation in Pt−a,b, which would have to have support over the entire unit interval in our data
for the selection correction to work. If that were the case we would be able to observe groups of
individuals for whom Pt−a,b = 1 (everyone goes to college) and Pt−a,b = 0 (nobody goes to college),
30allowing us to compute college and high school wages free from selection.30
Before we present any of our decompositions it is important to comment on the ﬁt of the model.
If the ﬁt is poor, then this exercise would not be as interesting. In the appendix (see ﬁgure A.7)
we show that the reduced-form model ﬁts almost perfectly the evolution of the college premium
from 1960 to 2000, as well as the evolution of the college and high school age premia.31
Figure 4 shows trends in quality-adjusted and unadjusted college and age premia using the
estimation results reported in column (1) of Table 1 (corresponding to the robust reduced form
model). In the top-left panel of the ﬁgure, the solid line correspond to CPt in (19), while the
dashed lines correspond to CP
Q
t in (22). This panel shows that the college premium increased by
18% between 1960 and 2000, but the quality adjusted college premium increased by 26%.32 There
is a substantial diﬀerence of 8 percentage points shown in the top-right panel (the solid line plots
the diﬀerence between the two lines in the previous panel), which is due to the large increase in
college enrollment during this period, also shown in the top-right panel (dashed line). The largest
decline in quality from 1970 to 1980 corresponds to the largest increase in college enrollment in
the same period and relatively modest decreases in quality in both 1980-1990 and 1990-2000 are
associated with a slowdown in the growth in college attainment in those periods.
The three bottom-left panels show a dramatic diﬀerence between adjusted and unadjusted
trends in the age premium in the college sector. For example, if we look at the unadjusted trends
from 1980 to 1990, then there is a large decrease of about 9% in the age premium between age
groups 25-30 and 36-40. On the other hand, the quality-adjusted trends show a decrease of only
of about 4%. This suggests that from 1980 to 1990, the quality of college workers in age group
36-40 declined substantially relative to that of those in age group 25-30. Interestingly, if we look
at changes from 1990 to 2000, there is a larger increase in the unadjusted age premium than in the
quality-adjusted age premium. This implies that from 1990 to 2000, the quality of college workers
in age group 36-40 increased substantially relative to that of those in age group 25-30. If we look
at the age premia of age groups 46-50 and 56-60 relative to the age group 25-30, then there is a
decrease in the unadjusted age premia from 1980 to 1990. However, there is an increase in the
quality-adjusted age premia for the same period. The three bottom-right panels show that there is
30Still, given the structure of our model which controls for selection migration and changes in the region of birth
quality, we can interpret the trend in ω
k,Q
atrb as being free of selection.
31The ﬁt of the college age premia is relatively poor for 1960s and 1970s. Thus, when we compare the quality-
adjusted and unadjusted college age premia, we focus on the period of 1980-2000.
32In the ﬁgure, the lines are based on ﬁtted values from the reduced-form model, i.e. column (1) of Table 1.
31virtually no quality change over time in the age premium in the high school sector. This is because
composition plays little role (if any at all) in explaining high school wages.
What remains to be shown is the set of changes in supply and composition across age groups
that drive the results we just discussed. Figure 5 shows us the main drivers of composition and
supply eﬀects in the age premium. The three left panels of the ﬁgure show the evolution of the
proportion in college over time for old and young workers, as well as their relative proportion over
time (rescaled to ﬁt the ﬁgure). The decrease and increase of the relative proportion in college
coincides with our interpretation that the quality of old college workers (age group 36-40) decreased
relatively (with respect to young college workers, age group 25-30) from 1980 to 1990 and increased
relatively from 1990 to 2000. In addition, the largest increase of the relative proportion in college
for age groups 46-50 and 56-60 (that is, the largest quality decline for those age groups) coincides
with the reversal of trends (decreasing trends in the unadjusted premia vs. increasing trends in
the adjusted premia) from 1980 to 1990. It is also clear from the ﬁgure that changes in quality
cannot possibly explain ﬂuctuations in the age premium in high school. The three right panels
of the ﬁgure show the labor supply of old workers relative to young workers for both college and
high school (measured in log weeks worked in each year). It appears that changes in relative labor
supply do not mimic the changes in age premia, especially in the college age premium (age premia
are shown in Figure 4). This suggests that changes in demand play an important role explaining
trends in age premia as well, just like the college premium.
We now move to our estimates of relative demands for college workers and older workers after
adjusting for quality. The trend in the relative demand for college skill is given by log(θCtr/θHtr).
It is well known that, without additional assumptions, one cannot identify this trend separately
from ρ (see equations (11) and (12)). Therefore, one alternative is to take an estimate of ρ from
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M,atrr).
From the estimates of equation (18) we can compute all the objects in this equation except ρ and
log(θCtr/θHtr). Card and Lemieux (2001) who, like us, use a sample of males only, estimate ρ to
32be close to 0.673 (table IV, column 3, shows that 1 − ρ = 0.327). This is the number we take for
our calculations. Given ρ, we compute the implied series for log(θCtr/θHtr).
In order to get the trend in the relative demand for older workers we just need to estimate the
changes in log(βat)|a=old − log(βat)|a=young, where βat is given in (11). This can be derived from
the series of ξkat from equation (13). The identifying assumption is that the trend in the demand
for older workers does not vary across regions. If it did, we would have the same identiﬁcation
problem as above, and we would not be able to distinguish this trend from ηk.
We could have made diﬀerent speciﬁcation choices, but we believe these are adequate. First,
since there are already several estimates of ρ in the literature and we have nothing to add to its
estimation, the most natural way to proceed is to use one of them in our calculations (although
it is possible that quality adjustments, absent from the literature so far, aﬀect the estimate of
ρ).33 Second, there is hardly any discussion in the literature about the trend in the demand for
older workers, and therefore we wanted to be as simple as possible in our speciﬁcation without
compromising the estimation of ηk. Our assumption produces estimates of ηk that are similar to
other ones in the literature, giving us conﬁdence in our procedure.
Table 11 shows demand estimates for college using the estimation results reported in columns
(2) and (3) of Table 1. In particular, it shows percentage changes in the relative demands for
all regions as well as four large Census regions. First of all, the trend in demand is shown to be
qualitatively the same regardless of the quality-adjustment: it increases in the 1960s, slows down
in the 1970s, accelerates in the 1980s, slows down again the 1990s. Estimated trends are also
quite similar across the four large regions. Controlling for the quality of college workers matters
quantitatively in some cases, but not in all cases. For example, the increase in the relative demand
for college at the national level is about 56% if we look at the unadjusted trend and is about 58%
in terms of the adjusted trend. The diﬀerence is less than 2%.
Recall that we have shown that using the the reduced-form-model estimates, increases in college
enrollment lead to a decline in the quality of college graduates between 1960 and 2000, resulting
in a decrease of 8 percentage points in the college premium. The reason why the changes in the
relative demand is much smaller than those in the college premium is the following. Recall that
the estimate of the eﬀect of college labor on college wages is upward biased (in absolute value) if
quality is not controlled for (see columns (2) and (3) of Table 1). Therefore, if the quality is not
33We are grateful to David Autor for suggesting this.
33adjusted, the eﬀect of the supply would be overestimated. With the quality adjustment, the trends
in demand are computed by residual eﬀects after subtracting the supply and quality eﬀects from
the college premium, whereas without the quality adjustment, those are obtained by subtracting
only the supply eﬀect that is overestimated, however. Because of this, there will be a smaller
diﬀerence between adjusted and unadjusted trends in demand than those in the college premium.
The quantitative degrees at which they diﬀer are empirical matters. Table 11 suggests that the
diﬀerence between adjusted and unadjusted trends in demand is quite small at the national level
but that this diﬀerence can be relatively large in some regions (e.g. South). One notable feature
of the empirical results in Table 11 is that the adjusted trends tend to be less ﬂuctuating than the
unadjusted trends over decades.
Table 12 shows relative demand estimates for old workers using the estimation results reported
in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1. As in Table 11, it shows percentage changes in the relative
demands for three old worker groups (36-40, 46-50, 56-60) with respect to the young worker group
(25-30). The most striking results are (1) the relative demands for old workers have increased from
1960 to 2000 quite substantially and (2) the quality adjustment plays a relative minor role, as in
the demands for college skill. Putting together the results presented in Table 11 and 12 indicates
that the main qualitative trends in relative demands for college and old workers can be described
by the use of the standard demand and supply model but that the interpretations of the supply
eﬀects would be fragile if the quality of college workers is not controlled for.
8 Can Declining Quality of Old Workers Explain the Rising Col-
lege Premium for Young Workers?
In this section, using the estimation results reported in Section 4, we revisit the analysis of
Card and Lemieux (2001), who explain the rising college premium for young workers (but not
for old workers) by a fall in the supply of young college workers relative to old workers. In contrast,
we show in this section that changes in quality are as important as changes in prices to explain the
phenomenon they document.
Table 13 summarizes our analysis. In column (1) we show changes from 1980 to 1990 in the
raw college premium (data), composition-ﬁxed (or quality-ﬁxed) college premium, and propor-
tion in college for the two age groups considered in Card and Lemieux (2001). In this table, the
34composition-ﬁxed college premium is constructed using the reduced-form model (i.e. column (1) of
Table 1). The diﬀerence in the growth of the raw college premium between those aged 25-60 and
those aged 45 - 60 is 10.3%, which Card and Lemieux (2001) attribute to a falling relative supply
of young college workers. An interesting thought experiment is the following: what would be this
diﬀerence if the quality of both age groups of workers were ﬁxed? According to our estimates, the
diﬀerence would be just 5.6%. That is, about 50% of observed increase in the college premium for
young workers relatively to old workers can be attributed to the declining quality of old college
workers relative to young college workers. In column (2), we carry out the same analysis for changes
from 1990 to 2000. Unlike the previous decade, the change in the college premium is negligible
regardless of quality adjustment.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the role of changes in composition in the evolution of college premium.
Changes in composition occur because individuals are heterogeneous, and when college attainment
increases there is a change in the average quality of college and high school graduates. Our esti-
mates allow us to construct composition adjusted trends in the college premium, which show that
composition accounts for one third of the decline of the college premium in the 1970s. Further-
more, if the quality composition of college graduates had not declined between 1960 and 2000 but
the supply of college gradates had increased by the same amount as was observed, the estimated
college premium would have increased by 8 percentage points more. We then revisit the analysis
in Card and Lemieux (2001) and show that the role of changes in supply has been overstated:
changes in quality are as important as changes in prices to explain why the college premium grows
at diﬀerent rates for young and old workers.
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We use data from the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Censuses (1% sample). Our data was
extracted from http://www.ipums.umn.edu/ (see Ruggles et al., 2004). We focus on white males,
between the ages 25 and 60. We exclude from the analysis all those who are foreign born. We
consider 5 year age groups (with the exception of the ﬁrst, which has 6 years): 25-30, 31-35, 36-40,
41-45, 46-50, 51-55.
For 1960, 1970 and 1980, the education variable we use is “highest grade of schooling”, while for
1990 and 2000 we use “educational attainment recode”. We group individuals into four categories:
high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, college graduate or more. For 1960,
1970 and 1980, we consider high school dropouts those who have completed less than 12 years of
schooling, high school graduates are those with exactly 12 years of completed schooling, college
graduates have completed 4 or more years of college, and some college is the category for those with
more than 12 but less than 16 years of schooling. For 1990 and 2000, dropouts are those with up
to 11 years of schooling, high school graduates have exactly 12 years of schooling, those with some
college have 1 to 3 years of college, and college graduates have four or more years of college. Our
ﬁnal classiﬁcation has two groups only, one comprising of high school graduates and high school
dropouts, and the other comprising of those with some college, a college degree, or above.
We compute weekly wages by dividing annual wage and salary income by annual weeks worked.
We deﬂate all wages to 1990 values using the CPI-U from the Economic Report of the President.
In order to compute average log wages for each year-age group-region of residence-region of birth
cell (the main outcome variable in our analysis) we drop all observations for whom real wages are
below 50 dollars per week.
For each year, region of birth and ﬁve year cohort we also estimate the proportion of individuals
who attend at least some college. However, even among adults, educational attainment increases
over time. Therefore we calculate an average proportion of individuals who attend at least some
college for each cohort and region of birth (common across years), by averaging this number across
all years, using as weights the number of individuals in each year, cohort and region of birth cell.
We consider 9 regions of birth and 9 regions of residence, and we drop from the sample those
individuals who are foreign born. In particular, we use the regions deﬁned by the Census: New
38England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont), Middle
Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania), East North Central (Illinois, Indiana, Michi-
gan, Ohio, Wisconsin), West North Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota), South Atlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Mary-
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia), East South Central (Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee), West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas),
Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming), Paciﬁc
(Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington).
We group individuals into cells deﬁned by ﬁve variables: schooling (high school or college),
year, age group, region of residence, and region of birth. The reason we do not use the state as the
regional unit is that the resulting cell sizes would be too small for our estimates to be reliable.
For each cell we compute the relevant average weekly log wages, log total weeks worked (a
measure of labor supply) and the proportion of individuals in college (a measure of composition).
The construction of wages and weeks worked described in this section is based on Card and Lemieux
(2001). Weekly wages for high school graduates are obtained by taking only males with exactly
12 years of schooling and dividing annual income from wages by annual weeks worked. Weekly
wages for college graduates are obtained in an analogous way, but considering only individuals with
exactly 16 years of schooling. Unfortunately, for the 1960 and 1970 US Censuses weeks worked are
only available in intervals: 1 to 13, 24 to 26, 27 to 39, 40 to 47, 48 to 49, 50 to 52. For these two
years we take the midpoint of each interval as our estimate of weeks worked.
Log weeks worked by high school graduates (or high school equivalents) are a weighted sum of
weeks worked by white males in each region of residence, who can be high school dropouts, high
school graduates, and even individuals with some college. Log weeks worked by college graduates
are a weighted sum of weeks worked by white males with some college, a college degree, or post-
graduate studies.
The weights for these sums are deﬁned as follows. Each high school dropout week is only a
fraction of a regular high school graduate week. This fraction corresponds to the relative wage
of high school dropouts and high school graduates. Similarly, each week worked by an individual
with a post-graduate degree has a larger weight than a week worked by a college graduate, and
the weight is given by the relative wage of post-graduates and college graduates. Finally, in order
to construct the weights for some college weeks, we ﬁrst look at the diﬀerence between high school
39graduate and college graduate wages. If the diﬀerence between some college wages and high school
graduate wages is say, one third of the diﬀerence between college and high school wages, then we
assign one third of some college weeks to high school, and two thirds to college. We allow these
weights to vary across age groups, but not across year or region.
A.2 Average and Marginal Students
Table A.14 in the appendix simulates the eﬀects of declining quality of marginal college graduates
on their average log wages for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model, and at diﬀerent levels of P. We
consider a simple economy that consists of only two schooling groups: high school graduates and
college graduates. Let w1 be the average log wage of the baseline college graduates and w2 be the
average log wage of the marginal college graduates. Note that the average log wage after college
expansion, say w∗, has the form:
w∗ = (1 − µ) × w1 + µ × w2, (A.1)
where µ is the proportion of marginal college graduates after college expansion. Since our model
is linear in the odds of college enrollment (Pt−a,b/(1 − Pt−a,b)), in view of the estimation result in
column (1) of Table 1, we have
w∗ = w1 − 0.085 × (changes in Pt−a,b/(1 − Pt−a,b)). (A.2)
Thus, combining (A.1) and (A.2) and solving for w2 gives
w2 = w1 − 0.085 × µ−1 × (changes in Pt−a,b/(1 − Pt−a,b)).
The column (4) of Panel A of Table A.14 shows the eﬀects of absolute increases of 10% in college
enrollment across diﬀerent baseline college enrollment rates and the same column of Panel B shows
those of proportional increases of 10% in college enrollment. For example, if the baseline college
enrollment rate is 40%, then an absolute increases of 10% in college enrollment leads to a decrease
of 14% in marginal college wages, thereby implying that the quality of the average marginal college
graduate is 14% lower than that of the average baseline college graduate. It can be seen that
marginal college graduates are always of lower quality than baseline college graduates, but the
40magnitude of the decrease in quality is larger when there is a higher proportion of baseline college
graduates. In other words, as college expands, it would induce lower and lower quality college
graduates. Our main qualitative results do not change when an alternative model speciﬁcation is
used. column (5) of Table A.14 reports that the main results are the same when the model is linear
in the level of college enrollment (Pt−a,b).34
Notice that changes in worker quality resulting from increases in college participation do not
necessarily have to lead to decreases in the college premium. Theoretically, the adjustment in the
college premium could go either way, depending on how individuals sort into diﬀerent levels of
schooling, and on how important heterogeneity is in high school and college (see Carneiro and Lee,
2008). Our results indicate that: i) skill heterogeneity and self selection into schooling are important
phenomena, so that if college enrollment went from 40% to 50%, the average marginal student’s
quality would be 14% lower than that of the average student in college; ii) those individuals with
the highest college skills select into college; iii) there is no clear relationship between the type of
skills used in high school occupations and selection into college.
A.3 Additional Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we present additional speciﬁcation checks. First, we show our results are robust to
the use of an alternative measure of composition. In particular, Table A.15 shows that if we use
the level of proportion in college rather than the odds of proportion in college, the college premium
would decline by 3.47% if college enrollment increases by 10% (0.10∗[−0.587 − (−0.240)] = 0.0347).
This change is comparable to 4.25%, which we obtained using the odds of proportion in college
when college enrollment changed from 50% to 60%.
Second, since we aggregate individuals into two levels of schooling only, one may worry that
changes in college attainment also lead to changes in composition within each of these aggregates
(between dropouts and high school graduates, those with some college and college graduates, or
those between college graduates and post-college-educated workers). This is likely to be the case,
but it does not seem to aﬀect our results. Table A.16 shows that the main results are basically
unchanged once we include measures of within group composition (the within odds of proportion in
dropout, the within odds of proportion in some college, and the odds of proportion in post college
34In this case, the corresponding coeﬃcient for Pt−a,b is −0.587 (see Table A.15), implying that
w2 = w1 − 0.587 × µ
−1 × (changes in P).
41enrollment). One thing to notice is that the estimated coeﬃcient for the odds of proportion in
college for the college equation changes from −0.085 to −0.073 if the odds of proportion in post-
college enrollment is controlled for.35 This amounts to a decline of 3.65% in average college wages
when the proportion of college participants increases from 50% to 60% (recall that the estimate
of −0.085 implies a drop of 4.25%). This suggests that there might be some sort of selection of
more able individuals out of college into post-college education, thereby implying that our baseline
estimate overstates the declining quality of college graduates. Our main result is still intact since
the magnitude of this potential bias is relatively small (the diﬀerence of 0.55% for average college
wages with respect to the change of the proportion of college participants from 50% to 60%) and
furthermore, the coeﬃcient for the odds of proportion in post-college enrollment is imprecisely
estimated.
Third, we rerun our basic models using diﬀerent dependent variables besides log weekly wages.
The estimation results are reported in Table A.17. For each (k,a,t,r,b) cell we compute the
average Duncan Socio Economic Index, average log annual total income, average employment
status. These are all alternative potential measures of worker quality. We then regress them on
the odds of proportion in college and the full set of dummy variables we use in our main (reduced
form) speciﬁcation, and ﬁnd that for college individuals there are strong negative eﬀects of increases
in college attainment on all variables except employment status. These results conﬁrm our main
ﬁndings for log wages. For high school, there is a negative eﬀect of changes in college attainment
on log annual total income, while for log wages we had found no evidence of composition eﬀects.36
35An anonymous referee points out potential biases due to selection out of college into post-college education and
suggests that we include the odds of proportion in post-college enrollment as an additional explanatory variable. We
are grateful to the referee for the insightful suggestions.
36This diﬀerence may occur for two reasons. On one end, the model may only be well speciﬁed for wages since we
can interpret t − a − r interactions as prices in that case, but probably not when we examine other variables. On
the other end, it is possible that high school quality declines as more individuals enrol in college, and although this
is not picked up in terms of wages, it is picked up in the log total income.




(Controlling for (Controlling for (Without Controlling
Quality) Quality) for Quality)
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.085 -0.093
[0.029]** [0.023]**




Observations 2659 2659 2659
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.011 -0.016
[0.024] [0.021]




Observations 2742 2742 2742
Panel C - Diﬀerence between College and High-School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.076
[0.030]*









(Age)×(Common Quadratic Time Trends)
√ √
(Odds of Proportion in College for Stayers)
√













2 √ √ √
(Observed Migr. Prob.)×(Staying Prob.)
√ √ √
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. The variable “Odds of Proportion in College” is
the odds of going to college for cohort t − a born in region b. The variable “Quality-Adjusted Log Weeks” is the
logarithm of the labor supply multiplied by the average quality. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the
sampling variance of average log wages in each cell. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of
residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
43Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis: Dropping One Region at a Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Dropping the Following Region:
Regions New Middle East North West North South East South West South Mountain Paciﬁc
England Atlantic Central Central Atlantic Central Central
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.085 -0.081 -0.074 -0.089 -0.091 -0.090 -0.068 -0.083 -0.084 -0.114
[0.029]** [0.029]** [0.029]* [0.032]** [0.030]** [0.034]* [0.028]* [0.031]* [0.028]** [0.033]**
Observations 2659 2404 2352 2347 2374 2348 2386 2357 2360 2344
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.011 -0.027 -0.022 -0.012 -0.012 0.009 0.001 -0.015 -0.007 -0.043
[0.024] [0.023] [0.022] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.026] [0.029]
Observations 2742 2471 2438 2429 2431 2429 2452 2430 2429 2427
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of average log wages in each cell.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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4Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis: Dropping One Year at a Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Dropping the Following Year:
Years 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.085 -0.080 -0.081 -0.067 -0.100 -0.109
[0.029]** [0.032]* [0.035]* [0.028]* [0.041]* [0.039]**
Observations 2659 2180 2143 2121 2097 2095
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.029 0.003
[0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.032] [0.027] [0.030]
Observations 2742 2223 2192 2186 2186 2181
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of average log wages in each cell.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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5Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Speciﬁcations and Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log College Wages Log High School Wages
White Males (Original Sample)
Odds of Proportion in College -0.085 -0.139 -0.011 -0.102
[0.029]** [0.105] [0.024] [0.103]
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 0.0140 0.024)
[0.026] [0.024]
Proportion in College -0.587 0.501 -0.240 -0.507




Observations 2659 2659 2659 2659 2742 2742 2742 2742
P-value 0.02 0.01 0.61 0.53
White Males without Farmers or Part-Time Workers
Odds of Proportion in College -0.077 -0.097 -0.007 -0.059
[0.029]* [0.106] [0.025] [0.117]
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 0.005 0.0140
[0.026] [0.028]
Proportion in College -0.445 0.848 -0.138 -0.214




Observations 2654 2654 2654 2654 2735 2735 2735 2735
P-value 0.04 0.02 0.88 0.87
White Females
Odds of Proportion in College 0.055 -0.074 0.027 0.060
[0.051] [0.092] [0.033] [0.078]
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 0.031 -0.009
[0.019] [0.020]
Proportion in College -0.361 -1.881 0.197 0.193




Observations 2398 2398 2398 2398 2698 2698 2698 2698
P-value 0.2 0.05 0.65 0.63
Both White Males and Females
Odds of Proportion in College -0.083 -0.409 -0.032 -0.232
[0.040]* [0.113]** [0.025] [0.126]
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 0.090 0.060
[0.031]** [0.032]
Proportion in College -1.032 -1.478 -0.481 -0.741




Observations 2728 2728 2728 2728 2799 2799 2799 2799
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.24
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at
5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
46Table 5: Estimation Results of Sensitivity Analysis (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.087 -0.074 -0.070 -0.085 -0.069 -0.081 -0.083
[0.028]** [0.031]* [0.029]* [0.029]** [0.031]* [0.035]* [0.034]*
Observations 2659 2659 2659 2659 2659 2344 2659
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.015 0.025 -0.016 -0.011 -0.017 -0.023 0.003
[0.024] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024] [0.021] [0.027] [0.024]
Observations 2742 2742 2742 2742 2742 2427 2742
Included Explanatory Variables
(Year)×(Age)×(Region of Residence)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
(Age)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
(Year)×(Region of Birth)




(Year)×(R. of Res.)×(R. of Birth)
√ √
Basic Migration Probabilities






Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of average log wages in each cell.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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7Table 6: Diﬀerences between Inclusion and Exclusion of Migration Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log College Wages Log High School Wages
Odds of Proportion in College -0.085 -0.087 -0.011 -0.015
[0.029]** [0.028]** [0.024] [0.024]
Staying Probability -0.499 -0.538 0.428 0.437
[0.780] [0.783] [0.643] [0.640]
(Staying Prob.)
2 0.277 0.313 -0.528 -0.525
[0.603] [0.602] [0.484] [0.483]
Observed Migration Probability -0.596 -0.600 -0.493 -0.493
[0.086]** [0.086]** [0.089]** [0.089]**
(Observed Migr. Prob.)
2 0.276 0.250 -0.337 -0.339
[0.192] [0.191] [0.169] [0.167]*
(Observed Migr. Prob.) 0.388 0.421 0.962 0.965
×(Staying Prob.) [0.237] [0.236] [0.186]** [0.183]**
Observations 2659 2659 2659 2742 2742 2742
Included Explanatory Variables
(Year)×(Age)×(Region of Residence)
√ √ √ √ √ √
(Year)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √ √ √ √
(Age)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √ √ √ √
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the
sampling variance of average log wages in each cell. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of
residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
48Table 7: Relationship between Proportion in College and Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Staying Observed Migration Migration Premium
Probability Probability
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College 0.016 -0.009 0.001 0.000 -0.062 0.021 0.021
[0.016] [0.014] [0.001] [0.002] [0.015]** [0.037] [0.036]
Observations 305 305 2455 2455 2344 2344 2344
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College 0.021 -0.030 0.001 0.002 -0.196 0.027 0.028
[0.009]* [0.010]** [0.000] [0.001] [0.038]** [0.033] [0.032]







√ √ √ √
(Age)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √ √
Basic Migration Probabilities
√
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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9Table 8: Average Ability of College Attendees and Proportion of Going to College
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Data: NLS66
Average Percentile Average Percentile Proportion Odds
(High School) (College) in College (P) in P
North 0.35 0.60 0.59 1.45
South 0.33 0.64 0.55 1.22
Diﬀerence 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.22
Data: NLSY79
Average Percentile Average Percentile Proportion Odds
(High School) (College) in College (P) in P
North 0.32 0.64 0.56 1.27
South 0.33 0.69 0.48 0.92
Diﬀerence -0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.35
Data: NLSY97
Average Percentile Average Percentile Proportion Odds
(High School) (College) in College (P) in P
North 0.36 0.64 0.51 1.04
South 0.37 0.66 0.46 0.86
Diﬀerence -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.17
Notes: Data are from the original cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Males (NLS66), the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 (NLSY79), and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1997 (NLSY97).
In each dataset, white males are divided into two groups: those growing up in the southern regions of the US, and
those growing up elsewhere. For each individual in each region, his percentile is computed in the distribution of
test scores within region (the AFQT in the NLSY79 and NLSY97, and IQ in NLS66). Then, the sample is divided
into those with some college or more, and those with less than college, and the average percentile in the test score
distribution is computed for each education group and region. Each number in columns (1) and (2) corresponds to
the average percentile in the within region test score distribution for each dataset, region and schooling group. For
each dataset and region columns, (3) and (4) show the proportion of individuals in the sample with at least some
college and its corresponding odds.
50Table 9: Regression of SAT Scores on the Percentage of High School Graduates Taking SAT, with
Year and State Dummies - 1993/2004 (except 1995 and 1998)
(1) (2)
SAT Math SAT Verbal
Percentage of High School -16.503 -26.268








Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 10: Regression of Quantitative Literacy on Proportion in College
(1) (2) (3)
Variable College High School All




Age 0.101 0.001 0.037
[0.024]*** [0.019] [0.013]***
Age Squared -0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000]***
Constant -0.794 -0.651 -1.050
[0.416]* [0.444] [0.295]***
Observations 962 1503 2465
R-squared 0.03 0.00 0.22
Notes: The dependent variable is the standardized quantitative literacy score of individuals aged 25-60 in the US
sample of the International Adult Literacy Survey. Proportion in college is the percentage of individuals with some
college or more and is computed for each cohort. The variable “College” is a dummy variable for individuals with
some college or more. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the cohort level. * signiﬁcant at 10%; **
signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
51Table 11: Changes in the Relative Demands for College Graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative Demand 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 1960-2000
All Regions Quality-Adjusted 15.79 8.71 19.57 13.71 57.78
Unadjusted 15.57 7.28 21.33 11.84 56.02
Northeast Quality-Adjusted 16.03 6.18 20.00 17.14 59.35
Unadjusted 15.38 2.95 21.59 14.75 54.67
Midwest Quality-Adjusted 14.22 8.24 19.64 14.44 56.54
Unadjusted 13.65 5.51 20.46 12.19 51.81
South Quality-Adjusted 16.48 11.94 19.39 12.77 60.58
Unadjusted 15.35 9.25 20.04 10.77 55.41
West Quality-Adjusted 20.19 9.15 18.19 12.73 60.26
Unadjusted 20.08 9.24 20.24 11.35 60.91
Notes: The reported numbers are one hundred times the changes in weighted averages of estimates of log(θCtr/θHtr),
where θktr is a factor-augmenting technology eﬃciency parameter for schooling group k in time period t in region r
and is given in (11) in the main text. The weights are based on proportions of the sample for each cell.
Table 12: Changes in the Relative Demands for Older Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age Group Relative Demand 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 1960-2000
36-40 vs. Quality-Adjusted -1.05 1.16 3.38 5.58 9.07
25-30 Unadjusted -1.73 1.01 3.75 6.50 9.53
46-50 vs. Quality-Adjusted 4.11 3.63 3.17 2.70 13.61
25-30 Unadjusted 3.86 3.64 3.41 3.18 14.09
56-60 vs. Quality-Adjusted 5.17 5.00 4.83 4.65 19.65
25-30 Unadjusted 5.57 5.37 5.16 4.95 21.05
Notes: The reported numbers are one hundred times the changes in estimates of log(βat)|a=old − log(βat)|a=young,
where βat is a factor-augmenting technology eﬃciency parameter for age group a in time period t and is given in (11)
in the main text.
52Table 13: Changes in the College Premium between Young and Old Workers
(1) (2)
Changes from 1980 to 1990 Changes from 1990 to 2000
Age Group: 25 - 30
Raw College Premium 0.171 0.043
Composition-Fixed College Premium 0.151 0.070
Proportion in College -0.041 0.059
Age Group: 45 - 60
Raw College Premium 0.068 0.034
Composition-Fixed College Premium 0.095 0.083
Proportion in College 0.114 0.138
Diﬀerences between Two Age Groups
Raw College Premium 0.103 0.008
Composition-Fixed College Premium 0.056 -0.013
Notes: This table shows changes from 1980 to 1990 in the raw college premium (data), in composition-ﬁxed (or
quality-ﬁxed) college premium, and in proportion in college for two age groups: 25-30 and 45-60.
53Table A.14: Changes in the log wages of marginal college graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Changes in Proportion of Changes in Log Wages of
College Enrollment College Enrollment Marginal College Graduates Marginal College Graduates
Model Speciﬁcation Linear in P/(1 − P) Linear in P
Panel A - Absolute Increase of 10% in College Enrollment
0.10 0.10 0.50 -0.02 -0.12
0.20 0.10 0.33 -0.05 -0.18
0.30 0.10 0.25 -0.08 -0.23
0.40 0.10 0.20 -0.14 -0.29
0.50 0.10 0.17 -0.26 -0.35
0.60 0.10 0.14 -0.50 -0.41
Panel B - Proportional Increase of 10% in College Enrollment
0.10 0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.06
0.20 0.02 0.09 -0.03 -0.13
0.30 0.03 0.09 -0.06 -0.19
0.40 0.04 0.09 -0.11 -0.26
0.50 0.05 0.09 -0.21 -0.32
0.60 0.06 0.09 -0.41 -0.39
Notes: This table shows the eﬀects of declining quality of marginal college graduates on their average log wages.
Consider an economy that consists of only two schooling groups: high school graduates and college graduates. Let
w1 be the average log wage of the baseline college graduates and w2 be the average log wage of the marginal college
graduates. Note that the average log wage after college expansion, say w∗, has the form:
w∗ = (1 − column(3)) × w1 + column(3) × w2.
If the model is linear in the odds of college enrollment (P/(1−P)), then w∗ = w1 −0.085×(changes in P/(1 − P)).
Thus, solving for w2 gives w2 = w1 + column(4), where column(4) = −0.085 × (changes in P/(1 − P))/column(3).
If the model is linear in the level of college enrollment (P), then w∗ = w1 − 0.587 × (changes in P). Thus, w2 =
w1 + column(5), where column(5) = −0.587 × (changes in P)/column(3). Panel A of the table shows the eﬀects of
absolute increases of 10% in college enrollment and Panel B shows those of proportional increases of 10% in college
enrollment.
54Table A.15: Regression of Wages on Diﬀerent Measures of Composition
(1) (2)
Explanatory Odds of Level of
Variable Proportion in College Proportion in College
Panel A - College
Regression Coeﬃcient -0.085 -0.587
[0.029]** [0.238]*
Observations 2659 2659
Panel B - High School
Regression Coeﬃcient -0.011 -0.240
[0.024] [0.233]
Observations 2742 2742
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. The regression includes basic controls as in column (1)
of Table 1. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant
at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table A.16: Regression of Wages with Measures of Within Group Composition
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Add Within Group Composition
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.085 -0.085 -0.073
[0.029]** [0.029]** [0.034]*
Odds of Proportion in Some College -0.023
[0.061]
Odds of Proportion in Post-College Enrollment -0.313
[0.327]
Observations 2659 2659 2659
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.011 -0.007
[0.024] [0.025]
Odds of Proportion in Dropout -0.006
[0.010]
Observations 2742 2742
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. The regression includes basic controls as in column (1)
of Table 1. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant
at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
55Table A.17: Regression of Various Outcomes on the Odds of College Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Duncan Log Total Employment
Wage Index Income Status
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.085 -2.174 -0.064 0.007
[0.029]** [0.473]** [0.027]* [0.008]
Observations 2659 2745 2751 2676
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.011 -0.780 -0.041 -0.003
[0.024] [0.413] [0.020]* [0.007]
Observations 2742 2802 2798 2774
Notes: All the regressions include basic controls as in column (1) of Table 1. Robust standard errors in brackets,
clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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College Premium Conditional on P in Region of Residence
Notes: This ﬁgure illustrates the intuition of our procedure. Using US Census data between 1960
and 2000, we group individuals into year-age-region of birth-region of residence cells. For each
cell we compute the college premium. We estimate the proportion of college participants for each
cohort and region of birth, and the proportion of college participants for each year, age and region
of residence. In particular, we consider white males aged 25-60 only, grouped into 5 year age groups.
We consider 9 regions of residence and 9 regions of birth (Census regions). The college premium
is the diﬀerence in average log wages of those with exactly 16 years of schooling and those with
12 years of schooling. The proportion of those in college is the proportion of individuals with at
least some college. The ﬁgure graphs the college premium in each cell against the proportion in
college by cohort and region of birth, after grouping individuals into three sets of regional labor
markets: those with a high share of college educated workers (30-40%), those with a medium share
(20-30%), and those with a low share (10-20%). Within each of these sets, there is a clear negative
relationship between the college premium and the proportion in college in each individual’s region
of birth. This is visible in the raw data, and conﬁrmed by the regression line. Each observation is
weighted by the inverse of the variance of the college premium in each cell. The slopes of all three
lines are negative and statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level.




































































Regional Trends in the Proportion Going to College
Notes: This ﬁgure shows regional trends in skill premia and changes in the proportion of going to
college.
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Percentage of High School Graduates taking the SAT
SAT−Math SAT−Verbal
Notes: The ﬁgure displays average verbal and math SAT scores by state (in 2004) against the
percentage of high school graduates who take the SAT in each state.
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Year
Age Premium Adjusted Age Premium
High School Age Premium − Ages 25−30 vs. 56−60
Notes: This ﬁgure shows quality-adjusted and unadjusted college and age premia.
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1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
College High School
Relative Log Weeks − Ages 25−30 and 56−60
Notes: The top left panel of the ﬁgure shows changes in proportion in college and their relative
ratio for age groups 25-30 and 36-40. The middle and bottom left panels, respectively, show
corresponding lines for older age groups 46-50 and 56-60 along with the baseline young age group,
25-30. The three ﬁgures on the right panel of the ﬁgure show the labor supply of old workers
relative to young workers for both college and high school, measured in log weeks worked in each
year.
61Figure A.6: Alternative Speciﬁcations of φk in the Reduced-Form Model








































































































































Notes: The top-panel of the ﬁgure shows alternative speciﬁcations of φC for log college wages in the reduced-form
model of equation (5). In particular, the alternative forms of φC are as follows: linear in P/(1−P), P, logP/(1−P),
or φ(Φ
−1(P))/P (the inverse Mills ratio based on the normality assumption) and also linear and quadratic in each
of these variables, where P is the birth-cohort/region-of-birth speciﬁc college enrollment rates. The bottom-panel
shows alternative speciﬁcations of φH for log high-school wages in the reduced-form model. The alternative forms of
φH are the same as the college equation except that the inverse Mills ratio for high school is now φ(Φ
−1(P))/(1−P).
In the college equation, all the p-values for the hypothesis that φC is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero are less than or
equal to 0.03, except for the case of a linear inverse Mills ratio (with a p-value of 0.12). In the high school equation,
the smallest p-value across all speciﬁcations is 0.31.
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Age Premium − Data Age Premium
Fit of Age Premium − High School, Ages 25−30 vs. 56−60
Notes: This ﬁgure compares data with the ﬁt of model based on column (1) of Table 1. The top
panel shows the ﬁt of the college premium and the three left-side panels and the three right-hand
side panels show the ﬁt of the college age premia and the high school age premia, respectively.
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